



At Last the Internationalization of
Retail Banking?  The Case of the




99-41THE WHARTON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTER
The Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to
the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for
competitive excellence.  The Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk
at the firm level as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.
The Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.
candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center.  The
Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is
informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as
they pursue competitive excellence.
A variety of working papers related to this subject are also available online at:
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic
If you would like to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research
community, please let us know of your interest.
Anthony M. Santomero
Director
The Working Paper Series is made possible by a generous
grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation 
 
 
 AT LAST THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL BANKING?
 THE CASE OF THE SPANISH BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA
 
 Mauro F. Guillén*
 The Wharton School
 University of Pennsylvania
 2000 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall





 Adrian E. Tschoegl
 The Wharton School
 University of Pennsylvania
 2000 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall












 * Corresponding author. We would like to thank Citibank for a generous grant to the
Wharton School. We are also grateful to the 33 regulators and bankers that gave so freely
of their time to answer questions. Irene Corominas, Pilar Freire, Gerardo Méndez, Camilo
Muñoz, and Arnaud Ripert provided able research and logistical support. Carlos Pertejo
provided useful industry reports. Still, the analysis and opinions in this paper are ours and




 AT LAST THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL BANKING?




 Since 1995 two Spanish banks—Banco Santander Central Hispano and Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya—have become the largest foreign banks in retail banking in Latin America. This
recent development merits careful analysis because foreign direct investment is rare in
retail banking. We find that the Spanish banks are exhibiting asset-seeking, asset-
exploiting, and oligopolistic behaviors, thus posing no serious challenge to established




 In a review of the literature on cross-border banking, Tschoegl (1987) concluded that
retail banking does not generally lend itself to foreign direct investment (FDI). Retail
banking is a mature industry and there is no reason to expect foreign banks to have any
particular advantage over domestic banks familiar with their local environment.
Historically, only Citibank (now Citigroup) has pursued a global retail strategy, though it
has focused on credit card and banking services for an urban professional class without
attempting to enter the mass retail market as the Spanish banks are doing.
 Since 1995 three Spanish banks—Banco Santander (Santander), Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya (BBV), and Banco Central Hispano (BCH)—have become the largest foreign
banks in Latin America. (In 1999 Santander and BCH merged to form Banco Santander 
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Central Hispano - BSCH). These banks have spent over US$4 billion to acquire large
stakes in almost 30 major banks in more than ten different countries (Table 1) accounting
for some US$40 billion in assets. Moreover, Table 1 does not include the numerous
acquisitions of credit card, consumer and commercial loan, insurance, stock brokerage and
pension fund management companies, or earlier acquisitions and pre-existing operations.
What is novel about this expansion is that the Spanish banks are acquiring some of the
largest domestic banks in their target countries and entering the general commercial and
mass retail market. Furthermore, the stock market seems to have endorsed this strategy.
Of the world’s 50 largest banks (in terms of market capitalization), BBV (at 56%) and
Santander (47%) ranked 1
st and 3
rd in terms of total stockholder returns between 1993 and
1998 (The Banker, July 1998, p. 20). The recent turmoil in emerging markets reduced the
banks’ valuations but this reflects judgments about the markets and not necessarily about
the banks’ activities.
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze this unprecedented phenomenon in the light of
existing FDI theory. The focus is on the phenomenon, not the theory, and our research
approach is idiographic (i.e., a case study). As Bengtsson et al. (1997) point out,
idiographic research seeks to create rich description that emphasizes qualitative and multi-
aspect concerns, in contrast to the nomothetic approach, which seeks statistical
generalizations based on analysis of a few aspects across large samples. Our aim is not to
prove, i.e. test, a particular explanation; rather, we intend to describe a unique
phenomenon and see the extent to which existing theories help us understand it or require
modification (Eisenhardt 1989). Our research included semi-structured interviews with 33
bankers and bank regulators in Latin America and Spain (see Appendix A), and 
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examination of bank documents, industry reports and banking system statistics.
 The sudden foray by the hitherto unknown Spanish banks brings up the standard six
questions in any study of foreign direct investment (Caves 1996)—who, where, what,
when, how and why? Who is the issue of exactly which banks are responsible for the
phenomenon. Where raises the issue of the choice of Latin America as the target region.
What is the question of retail banking—the banks’ apparently anomalous choice of the
product market to enter. When involves the timing of the banks’ expansion. How is the
question of the different market entry strategies. Lastly, Why is the issue of the reasons
behind the banks’ strategies. We deal with each of these six questions in turn.
 
Who: Santander, BBV and BCH
BSCH and BBV are the survivors in an ongoing process of consolidation in Spain’s
banking sector. For decades seven big institutions dominated Spanish banking. Given their
extensive branch networks and the tight regulatory framework, they grew primarily by
acquiring smaller institutions. For much of the postwar period these banks operated as a
de facto cartel; the banks met regularly to fix interest rates and lobby the government
(Pérez 1997). By the late 1980s, however, the situation started to change. Competition for
market share intensified and the government encouraged mergers as a way to break the
cartel and to prepare for European integration. Intermediation margins fell, and, though
still solid, the banks worried about their long-term profitability. Besides entering new
product markets—stock brokerage, pension funds, and value-added services—several of
the big banks began to view international expansion as a way to enhance profitability by
exploiting their skills more fully. 
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In 1995 Santander, BBV and BCH were fairly similar in terms of age, size and focus
on retail banking. Yet, they differed in terms of control, managerial style, and strategic
posture (Interviews #7, 9, 14, 16 and 17 in Appendix A). A brief profile of each bank
reveals these common and divergent features and how they have shaped the banks’
international strategies.
 Banco Santander, then the largest bank in Spain (see Table 2), was founded in 1857
as a commercial bank. It was also a bank of issue until 1878 when note issuance became a
monopoly of the Banco de España. Although Santander initially specialized in the Spanish-
American trade flowing through the northern port city of Santander, it did not venture
abroad until the 1950s when it opened representative offices in Mexico City and London.
In the 1970s and 1980s it expanded its network of offices in Latin America and elsewhere
and made a few small acquisitions such as its 1982 acquisition of insolvent Banco Español
Chile which it later renamed Banco Santander.
 At home, Santander grew via acquisition but remained a mid-sized institution until the
late 1980s. Between 1989 and 1992, Santander seized the moment to revolutionize
Spain’s retail banking by introducing mutual funds, high-yield checking and savings
accounts, and low-interest mortgages. The market quickly became too competitive for any
major bank to gain significant market share absent mergers so in 1994 Santander bought
Banco Español de Crédito (Banesto). This catapulted Santander into first place among
Spanish banks. Santander’s chairman is Emilio Botín (b. 1934), whose family has
controlled the bank since the 1950s.
 Santander started its current expansion abroad in the late 1980s with several small
acquisitions, including that of Portugal’s Banco de Comércio e Indústria in 1990. 
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Santander’s only foray into the U.S. commercial banking market took place in 1991 when
it acquired 13.3% of First Fidelity Bancorporation for $650 million. First Fidelity merged
with First Union in 1995, and Santander sold its stake in 1997 for $2.2 billion, using the
proceeds to amortize the goodwill of its Latin American acquisitions. Santander built its
current assault on Latin America around Santander Investment, its investment-banking
arm, and many of its acquisitions are banks with a strong local investment banking
franchise. The head of Santander Investment was Ana Patricia Botín, the chairman’s
daughter and his then heir-apparent (she left the bank after the merger with BCH).
Santander has generally bought majority stakes in its acquisitions and has put its brand
name on them (Interviews #3 and 21). Its Latin American operations accounted for almost
50% of foreign assets and for 48% of net attributable profits in 1997.
 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV), the second largest bank in Spain, is the result of a
merger in 1988 between Banco de Bilbao and Banco de Vizcaya. Merchants and
industrialists started Banco de Bilbao in 1856 to serve their needs and as a bank of issue.
In the following decades it became a key financier for the development of steel making in
the Basque region. Banco de Bilbao opened its first foreign office in 1902, in Paris, but
remained focused on the domestic market. Banco de Vizcaya started in 1901, also in
Bilbao. Both banks grew via acquisition but Vizcaya always had a stronger foreign
orientation. In the late 1920s it founded the Banque Français et Espagnol in Paris. From
the early 1970s it opened branches in New York, and later Amsterdam, London, Paris and
San Francisco and representative offices in Mexico, Frankfurt, Tokyo and Rio de Janeiro.
 In the 1990s, BBV followed Santander into Latin America, where BBV originally
tended to buy minority stakes, providing the project was large enough and BBV had 
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management control. Over time the bank gained confidence and knowledge, and when the
price was acceptable, it has increased its stake to a majority position. Recently, BBV has
appointed a manager in Madrid to be responsible for BBV América (Interview #16),
which includes all its Latin American operations. These accounted for 23% of
consolidated assets and 17% of net attributable profits in 1997. BBV operates something
of a matrix system in which the country manager dominates. Functional managers in each
country coordinate with their counterparts in Madrid but do not report to them.
 Banco Central Hispano (BCH), the third largest bank in Spain, is the result of a
difficult 1991 merger between Banco Central and financially troubled Banco Hispano-
Americano. Its founders started Hispano-Americano at the turn of the century with capital
repatriated to Spain from its last colonies but the bank became primarily a domestic
institution. BCH inherited a number of investments that Central and Hispano-Americano
had made in the 1960s, but disposed of or reorganized most of these. BCH was therefore
a latecomer in the recent Spanish drive into Latin America. It was also the only bank that
accomplished its entry through joint venture arrangements with local partners.
 In 1999 Santander and BCH announced their merger. Banco Santander Central
Hispano is now the largest commercial bank on the Iberian peninsula. The Co-Chairmen of
the merged bank are the previous Chairmen of the merged banks, while Ángel
Corcóstegui, the CEO of BCH, is now the CEO of BSCH. The merger is resulting in
some consolidation of the banks’ investments, and a partial divestiture in Chile mandated
by the government on the grounds of maintaining competition.
 Other Spanish banks have played a role in Latin America, but generally a small one.
The most notable is Argentaria, currently undergoing privatization, which is a 
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government-owned amalgam of several banks. It has reorganized the investments in Chile,
Argentina and Uruguay that it inherited from its subsidiary, Banco Exterior, once Spain’s
official export credit bank. It has kept retail operations in Panama and Paraguay, but is
concentrating on corporate banking and foreign trade. Argentaria is also actively pursuing
opportunities in pension management, sometimes in partnership with Citibank. Its
chairman, Mr. Fransisco González, has argued that “Latin America is not a priority. The
payoff for doing things right here [in Spain] is a lot more profitable than buying something
in Latin America” (Financial Times, May 14, 1997).
 
Where: Latin America
 Given that the Spanish banks wished to expand internationally in order to overcome
competitive saturation in the home market, the issue of where to go was relatively
straightforward. Western Europe was already well-served by domestic institutions and the
Spanish banks had already established themselves in their nearest neighbor, Portugal. BBV
and Santander had acquired local banks and BCH had taken a minority position in BCP-
BPA, the largest Portuguese bank. Elsewhere, the markets were already mature and
offered no particular foothold. As the Deputy Chairman of BBV once pointed out, the
US$3 billion that BBV had invested in all of Latin America to that time would not have
bought them one percent of the market in a major European country such as Italy.
 Still, the Spanish banks have acquired some small banks, taken small (generally less
than 10%) stakes in larger banks, and also established strategic alliances in Europe. BBV
is a member of the Trans-European Banking Services Group (est. 1997), which brings
together eleven European banks, and Inter-Alpha (est. 1972), which brings together 
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thirteen banks. These alliances represent agreements between the banks to share
information and generally not to compete with each other (Marois & Abdessemed 1996).
Santander has an alliance with Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). They also jointly control
RBS Gibraltar where Santander owns 49.9% of the equity and RBS the rest.
 With Europe being of only limited interest, that left the emerging markets of Asia,
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Before the recent crisis, most Asian countries did not
permit foreigners to acquire local commercial banks. Also, the Spanish banks clearly had
no particular advantage vis-à-vis other foreign banks in either Eastern Europe or Asia,
except in the Philippines where Santander did establish a subsidiary. Lastly, other
European banks, many with historical ties to the region such as the Germans and
Austrians, had already established themselves in the countries of Eastern Europe.
 Conversely, the commonality of language has made Latin America comfortable for
the Spanish and permits easy communication (there is no need to translate memos or
manuals) and transfer of managers (Interviews #12 and 19; Caves 1996; Johanson and
Vahlne 1977). Lastly, the Spanish banks already had some familiarity with the region. All
had had some offices, branches or small subsidiaries there since the 1970s and early 1980s.
In the late 1980s, Santander Investments re-entered several Latin American countries from
which Santander had withdrawn at the start of the debt crisis. This is consistent with
Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) model of internationalization as increasing commitment
accompanying increasing knowledge.
 We can observe the same dynamic among the Portuguese banks (Appendix B). In
addition to their investments in Brazil that parallel the Spanish in the rest of Latin




What: Retail Banking to the Mass Market
 The Spanish banks have bought large stakes in large banks. Automatically, they have
chosen to compete in the mass market, rather than in a niche (Interviews #7, 9, 14, 16,
17). The Spaniards are competing in the lower and middle-income (LMI) markets where
they come into competition with the largest domestic banks. The only foreign bank that
had previously made foray into Latin America comparable in its geographic scope was
Citibank. By contrast to the Spanish banks, Citibank traditionally focused on the upper-
income market, frequently referred to as the A, B, and C1 segments (Interviews #4 and
12). BankBoston too has focused on the upper-income market, but has such operations
only in Argentina and Brazil. Citibank and BankBoston are well-established operations as
their presence in many Latin American countries often dates back to the early 1900s.
Deutsche Bank and some other Europeans have owned isolated retail operations in
Argentina and elsewhere that are indistinguishable in their operations from domestically-
owned banks.
 The Spanish banks have transferred banking skills that are primarily useful in the mass
retail market. Interviews revealed that, after making an acquisition and gaining managerial
control, the bank would bring in expertise from the home operation for both the asset and
the liability side. Information systems and risk assessment were among the first areas
subject to overhaul (Interviews #3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 16-18, 21). The introduction of new
products to expand the deposit base would then follow. Innovations that the Spaniards
brought in from the home country included banking products with differentiated features
such as lottery-linked accounts (Interviews #3, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19; Guillén & Tschoegl 
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1998) or fast-approval mortgages.
 
When: Since 1995
 The issue of timing emerged from our field research as a key variable in the FDI that
we observed. The scissors had two blades: Latin America opened its doors to foreign
investment—also in Mexico and elsewhere, governments put banks that they owned on
the auction block—at the precise time that the Spanish banks were looking for possible
foreign acquisitions (Mas 1995; Molano 1997; Interview #12).
 Although the timing and sequence of economic and political opening differ by
country, the logical historical reference point is the Latin American debt and banking
crises of 1982. Since then, and as Latin America’s “lost decade” lingered on,
democratically elected presidents came to power across the region. These governments—
with the support of broad coalitions of the middle class and business interests—managed
to introduce market-oriented reforms of the financial system including liberalization of
foreign entry. As Grosse (1997) points out, from 1971 to 1987 the Andean pact countries
barred foreign banks from owning more than 20% of local banks. Thus only recently have
these countries’ banking sectors become ripe for foreign investment.
 The Spanish banks were not the only ones to respond to the developing opportunity.
As Tables 1 and 3 show, following the start of the Spanish push in 1995, a number of
foreign banks also started to buy banks in Latin America. The two with the widest
geographic scope were Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC). More recently ABN-AMRO has joined in. Still, as one can see by
comparing the two tables, the Spaniards seem to have a regional strategy aimed at 
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dominating as many national markets as possible.
 At the same time, a normal ebb and flow was also occurring. Thus Deutsche Bank
withdrew from its long-time retail presence in Argentina to concentrate on Europe and
sold all but one of its branches to Bank Boston. Losses from over-ambitious expansion
elsewhere forced Crédit Lyonnais to sell its earlier acquisitions, including one subsidiary to
long-established Deutsche Sudamerikanische Bank. Similarly, Banque Sudameris, which
has been in Latin America since its foundation as a Franco-Italian overseas bank in 1910,
made an acquisition.
 However, in general there were few other well-capitalized banks in a position to make
acquisitions in the region (Interview #21). Since the early 1990s the Japanese banks have
been under tremendous strain domestically and have been withdrawing from investments
around the world. Many European banks, including the Dutch and the Germans were busy
expanding to Eastern Europe. During the early 1990s American banks were busy with
mergers and acquisitions in their home market, though perhaps spurred by the Spanish
banks, Citibank, BankBoston and Chase Manhattan have started to make selective
acquisitions.
 
How: Acquisition of Major Domestic Banks
 Entry via acquisition rather than via a greenfield operation follows equally from a
decision to make a financial investment or from a decision to enter the mass retail market.
Obviously, if one’s intent is a financial investment then acquiring a suitably sized operation
or taking a small portion of a large operation makes more sense than establishing a de
novo operation that will of necessity be small. 
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 If the entrant wishes to compete in retail banking by introducing new products it is
very important to gain market share in significant chunks as opposed to growing
organically from scratch. The inability to patent innovations means that having an
extensive branch network over which to deliver the product matters. Thus, the entry
strategy of the Spanish banks is in sharp contrast to the strategies of Bank of Boston and
Citibank, which traditionally have focused on a smaller clientele and hence have been
content to grow more organically.
 The Spanish banks have kept even their wholly-owned acquisitions as local
subsidiaries rather than as branches of the parent.
1 Banks generally use foreign branches
for wholesale and corporate banking activities in host countries (Heinkel and Levi 1992),
including Treasury (foreign exchange and money market trading). As Sabi (1988) has
pointed out, the reasons banks most frequently cite for their presence in LDCs is financing
international trade and servicing their home country (corporate) customers, both of which
the bank can do more easily via a single branch in a country’s financial center. Heinkel and
Levi (1992) show that foreign banks respond to different factors when creating
subsidiaries then when creating representative offices, agencies or branches. Unless forced
to by local regulation, banks do not use subsidiaries as a substitute for other organizational
forms. Subsidiaries appear frequently simply to represent financial investments, vehicles
                                                
 
1 Branches are an integral part of the parent; a branch cannot fail unless the parent fails. Subsidiaries and
affiliates are separate legal entities, and typically, incorporated in the host country. Because it is a separate
entity, a subsidiary may fail even though the parent is solvent. Conversely, a subsidiary may be solvent
even though the parent has failed. Under the Basle agreements, host country supervisory authorities are




for specialized activities such as leasing or commercial credit, or the vehicle for retail
banking.
 The Spanish banks (including Argentaria) had had some existing operations in Latin
America since at least the 1970s. These were generally branches and representative offices
in the various national financial centers, though there were a few small retail subsidiaries
as well. Had the banks simply wished to continue to serve their existing Spanish corporate
customers, this network of branches, perhaps augmented slightly, would have sufficed.
Again, this is the strategy that Argentaria is following and the push into mass-market retail
banking does not mean that BSCH or BBV have abandoned their traditional corporate
business. As far as retail banking is concerned, Santander at least could have built such an
operation on the basis of organic growth. However, it was Santander that set off the rush
by buying large, existing local banks, even in places such as Chile where it had a small
subsidiary.
 Beyond the issue of greenfield vs. acquisition, it is important to explain why the three
Spanish banks followed different entry strategies regarding majority vs. minority stakes,
joint venture partners, and the degree to which head-office involves itself in the
management of the acquired banks. Santander has been most aggressive in seeking
majority stakes with full managerial control and brand-image coordination, whereas BBV
initially preferred minority stakes, gradually increasing them over time (Interviews #3, 21
and 16). In sharp contrast to either of these two strategies, BCH has opted for joint
ventures with local partners without promoting its own brand (Interviews #19 and 21).
 Santander was the most assertive in its Latin American expansion primarily because
of its strong capital base, prior investment banking experience in the region, and the strong 
 
 15
personality and leadership of its chairman—who likes to make expeditious and far-
reaching decisions. Numerous press reports contrast Santander’s “presidencialista” style
with BBV’s “team style” of management. Our interviewees singled this out as a key
difference between the two banks (Interviews #3, 6, 8, 9, 16-18 and 21; Euromoney Sep
1997: 209-216; AméricaEconomía Dec 1997: 58-66 and Jun 4, 1998: 44-47).
 Initially BBV was more cautious than Santander because BBV lacked the exposure to
the region that Santander Investment had given Santander. BBV has now inaugurated the
“1000 Days Plan.” This is its new international strategy and one which explicitly aims at
creating shareholder value. The first phase included the acquisition of leading local banks
in Latin America. Over the last three or four years, BBV has leveraged its strong capital
base and managerial resources to take full control and coordinate its strategy across
borders. Currently the bank is in the second phase of the plan: consolidation to cut costs
and increase efficiency throughout the BBV system, including Latin America. As a bank
run by managers rather than a dominant owner, BBV may also have been more tolerant of
partners (Interviews #16 and 18).
 Lastly, BCH has been the weakest in terms of having the resources on which to build
its international expansion. Of the three, it is the least profitable and has the least
managerial depth (Interview #21). The difference in behavior between Santander and BBV
on the one hand and BCH on the other is consistent with Kindleberger’s (1969) argument
for FDI as stemming from “surplus managerial resources.” This, in turn, is consistent with
resource-based views of the firm.
 BCH’s decision to enter into joint ventures with local partners also reflected its
perception that the risks of entering emerging markets were high. BCH allied itself with 
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the Luksic group, one of the largest family-controlled industrial and service conglomerates
in Chile. The investment vehicle was O’Higgins Central Hispano (OHCH), an almost 50-
50 joint venture (BCH held a few more shares than did the Luksic group). BCH had
acquired banks in the Southern Cone through OHCH rather than directly, and was looking
for a partner for northern South America. In Mexico and elsewhere BCH had taken
minority stakes and in Puerto Rico it sold its subsidiary to Santander. In the opinion of
Ángel Corcóstegui, its CEO, the joint venture arrangement allowed BCH to test the
waters, learn, and then consider whether to escalate its commitment or not. Also, this
strategy hedged against the possible emergence of xenophobia in the host countries. The
enthusiasm for foreign owners as rescuers of the banking system may fade over time, only
to be replaced by concern over foreign domination (Interviews #14 and 19). Since the
merger with Santander, BSCH has bought-out the Luksic group’s share in OHCH for a
reported US$4-600mn.
 
Why: Asset Seeking and Exploiting, and Oligopolistic Reaction
 Williams (1997) provides a recent and comprehensive review of the literature on FDI
in banking. His assessment is that the internalization approach, which traces back to
Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) provides an adequate general explanation. That
said, most of the extant empirical literature uses aggregate and macroeconomic data to
examine what in fact is a microeconomic phenomenon. It also tends to focus on FDI in
corporate and wholesale banking (Grubel 1977), precisely because of the relative rarity of
FDI in retail banking.
 Three sets of explanations for the Spanish banks’ sudden rise to international 
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prominence emerge from our analysis of the evidence. The first two explanations fall
under Caves’ (1996, 1998) rubrics of asset-seeking and asset-exploiting behavior. The
third is oligopolistic reaction (Hymer 1976; Knickerbocker 1973).
 
 Asset-Seeking
 The Spanish banks have been seeking to enter markets that permit them faster growth
and higher margins than they are able to achieve at home, as virtually each of our
interviewees explained. As Table 4 shows, Latin America differs both from the Asian
emerging markets and the advanced markets in terms of the development of the banking
sector. The ratio of money supply to GDP (a rough guide to the size of the banking sector
relative to that of the economy) is lower than elsewhere. Also, expenses in Latin America,
and interest margins, even net of expenses, are higher than elsewhere. As we will discuss
below, the Spanish banks believe that they can introduce efficiencies. Even without this,
the Spanish saw markets that provided the possibility of growth with the development of
the banking sector and high margins.
 As Ragazzi (1973) has pointed out, barriers to the flow of portfolio capital alone may
motivate FDI. There is no penalty to acquiring assets when barriers segment capital
markets. If it is cheaper for Santander to assemble a portfolio of Latin American banks
than for its shareholders to do it by themselves, FDI itself adds value even if the investor
does not change cash flows in the acquisitions (Errunza and Senbet 1981).
 One should also note that the investments in Latin America are both a poison pill to
some acquirers and a distinct bargaining chip vis-à-vis others. Spain has formed part of the
European Union since 1986 and is one of the initial entrants into the Euro. A single 
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financial market and currency in Europe may encourage other European banks to examine
the Spanish banks as possible acquisition targets. As Emilio Ybarra, Chairman of BBV,
has pointed out, “BBV’s global franchise in Latin America represents a substantial
interchange value for any future agreement with European banks.” The Madrid daily, El
País (July 9, 1998, p. 51) has reported Rolf E. Breuer, President of Deutsche Bank, as
saying that Spanish banks “are not big enough” to compete in the new European market.
He added that their “aggressive though successful” position in Latin America has turned
them into “attractive partners” for future mergers or alliances.
 
 Asset-Exploiting
 The Spanish banks are not just passive acquirers of assets. If they were, there would
be no need to insist on management control. Their public statements and our interviews
(Interviews #3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 16-18 and 21), clearly signal that the Spanish banks believe
that they have something to offer. That is, they believe that they can improve cash flows in
their acquisitions. Having just gone through a transition at home from non-competitive to
extremely competitive markets (Peréz 1997), they believe that they have relevant skills and
experience to bring to the table. The evidence is mixed, but suggests that after some
turbulence around deregulation, the Spanish banks overcame their earlier limitations and
became efficient (Rodríguez 1989; Grifell-Tatjé & Lovell 1996; Maudos, Pastor &
Quesada 1997).
 The starting point for what Caves (1998) has called asset-exploiting explanations for
FDI is Hymer’s (1976) classic proposition: “Given the costs of operating at a distance and
in an unfamiliar environment, the foreign firm must have some off-setting advantage if it is 
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to compete against local firms.” Retail banking is a mature industry in which one cannot
patent one’s innovations. Hence foreign banks generally have no advantage vis-à-vis the
local banks. One common exception is ethnic banking—providing banking services to
home-country emigrants resident in the host country. Ethnic banking is not what the
Spaniards are doing in Latin America, and opportunities for ethnic banking are limited,
especially when the host country and the immigrants share a language. Thus, Tschoegl
(1987) has argued that one should generally not expect to see foreign banks entering retail
markets. Dufey and Yeung (1993) make the same point for the prognosis for evolution of
banking in the European Union. Ethnic banking aside, Tschoegl (1987) did suggest two
situations where FDI in retail banking might be possible for a time. The first case is in
markets where the incumbent banks are not very competitive, perhaps because of a
dominant oligopoly. The second case is in fast growing markets.
 Relative to domestic banks in Latin America, the Spanish banks are better managed
and have more experience with a competitive market. Some of the local banks, frequently
the largest, are government-owned. As Marichal (1997) points out, dominance of banking
by government-owned banks, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, dates
from the 19
th century. For the six Latin American countries in Table 4, the share of
banking system assets in government banks averages 30%. Typically, government-owned
banks have created price and service standards that have taken little effort to match. Often
this has been an unintended consequence of implicit taxes in the form of policy mandates
to maintain employment, uneconomic branches in rural areas and preferential services for
designated recipients (Grosse 1997). Generally, the lack of a rivalrous domestic market
has left the locally-owned but non-government banks backward. The Spanish banks in 
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Latin America then provide an interesting example of a situation where the foreign direct
investors have no advantage vis-à-vis each other, but do vis-à-vis their host-country
competitors. This is in line with Hu’s (1995) warning against blindly inferring an entrant’s
advantage abroad from their advantage at home.
 The Spanish banks have transferred knowledge from Spain to Latin America. One
obvious parent contribution has been the introduction of an aggressive posture built on the
introduction of new products. Generally, wherever local regulations have permitted it, the
Spanish banks have introduced the lottery-linked deposit accounts they offer in Spain
(Guillén & Tschoegl 1998); these have been an innovation everywhere the Spanish banks
have introduced them. The banks have also improved the issuing, pricing and term of
mortgages relative to all the banks targeting the mass market, introduced mini-branches in
supermarkets, gas stations and other non-traditional venues, and generally improved the
assessment of credit risk and other banking processes in the banks they have acquired.
 Both Santander and BBV make use of expertise within their subsidiaries. Both send
individual executives and teams on short-term assignments to other subsidiaries to help
with specific projects such as the introduction of new systems or products. BBV also has a
program under which 50 lower and middle managers from Latin America will work in
BBV Spain for two years in regular jobs (not internships), before returning to their home
banks. In some cases the parents have brought in senior managers from Spain.
 One could argue that relative to most other foreign banks the Spaniards have a
linguistic and cultural advantage though this is not as true in the case of the long-
established foreign banks such as Citibank and BankBoston. Citibank and BankBoston
have tried to be “embedded”—Citibank’s term—in each host country. This has led to a 
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cream-skimming strategy of corporate banking and banking to urban professionals while
not pushing the limits in terms of aggressiveness. Neither Citibank nor BankBoston
targeted the mass market that the Spanish banks targeted through their acquisitions. In his
survey of 16 US, Canadian and Netherlands banks in Latin America, Grosse (1997) found
that these banks had a strong orientation towards wholesale commercial banking, and little
interest in retail banking. Lastly, the very few other foreign-owned retail banks in Latin
America prior to the acquisition wave that followed the Spanish banks (again, Table 3)
were indistinguishable in their behavior from the domestic banks. Thus to a great degree
the Spanish banks’ chief competitors have been each other. Citibank and BankBoston’s
recent acquisitions of local banks or branches suggest that the banks’ strategies may be
changing.
 Second, rapidly growing markets tend to be forgiving ones. If most of the participants
are fully occupied with simply managing the problems of average growth, they will have
neither the time nor the resources to devote to taking market share away from each other.
The countries in Latin America are underbanked with a low density of bank branches.
Now that these countries are recovering from the “lost decade,” the situation is one in




In addition to asset seeking and exploiting, the whole expansion of the Spanish banks
represents a case of oligopolistic reaction. In the “oligopolistic reaction” pattern that
Knickerbocker (1973) and Flowers (1976) first identified, a firm matches the location 
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choices of a rival in a pattern of move-countermove or action-reaction. The pattern may
begin with one firm (e.g., Santander) making the first move and others (e.g., BBV and
BCH) following the leader, but as in the case of the Spanish banks, a leapfrogging of
leadership occurs so that at some point one can no longer unambiguously describe one
firm or the other as the overall leader.
Oligopolistic reaction is a form of rivalrous behavior that stands in contrast to the
“mutual forbearance” pattern in which a firm avoids markets in which a rival has already
established itself and the rival reciprocates. Yu and Ito (1988) and Ito and Rose (1994)
found evidence of oligopolistic reaction among manufacturing firms. Empirical studies of
banks offer mixed results. While Choi et al., (1986, 1996) found support for forbearance
among large, international banks, Ball and Tschoegl (1982) found evidence consistent with
oligopolistic reaction for foreign banks establishing themselves in Tokyo and California.
Engwall and Wallenstäl (1988) argued that Swedish banks in their internationalization
copied each other. Jacobsen and Tschoegl (1998) argued that the Nordic consortium
banks may have exhibited both oligopolistic reaction and some mutual avoidance
depending on the characteristics of the places involved. That is, they clustered in major
international financial centers such as London and New York, and avoided each other
elsewhere. By contrast, the Spanish banks were engaging in oligopolistic matching in Latin
America, not mutual forbearance, something that the bankers that we interviewed fully
acknowledged (Interviews #4, 5, 10 and 21).
 In oligopolistic reaction the reference set starts parochial and in time may become, in
Perlmutter’s (1969) terms, geocentric. The Spanish banks started by reacting primarily to
each other’s moves but now have by-and-large established their Latin American networks. 
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This has brought them into contact with competitors such as Citibank and HSBC, both of
which have built worldwide networks that include Latin America. They are also now in
contact with Bank of Nova Scotia and other Canadian banks that have started to expand
beyond the Caribbean (Baum 1974) into Latin America. Before, the Spanish banks met
Citicorp only in a few financial centers around the world, and HSBC and Bank of Nova
Scotia in even fewer, and probably competed little if at all with them. Now they are all
competing intensively with each other throughout Latin America.
 
Conclusion
 The three strategic behaviors we have observed—asset seeking, asset exploiting and
oligopolistic reaction—provide the basis for formulating the following explanation for the
massive presence of Spanish banks across retail banking markets throughout Latin
America. By the late 1980s the Spanish banking market was becoming saturated and
rivalrous. Consequently, the Spanish banks sought other growth opportunities. For a
variety of reasons Europe, Eastern Europe and Asia held limited attraction. However,
banking markets in Latin America were facing in the early 1990s the kind of deregulation
and liberalization that the Spaniards had experienced in their home market a few years
back. Once one bank, Santander, started to invest in Latin America, oligopolistic reaction
set in. The other two leading Spanish banks quickly matched Santander as all three raced
to acquire banks across the region. Here, in environments that were linguistically and
culturally comfortable, the Spanish banks started to transfer their technology and
knowledge about product differentiation to their acquisitions and hence host countries.
 Spanish banking FDI in Latin America requires understanding the shifting competitive 
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environment of banking over the last decade. Financial deregulation and privatization in
Europe and Latin America have opened up new horizons, and have enhanced competition
via product differentiation and effective leverage of new information and
telecommunications technologies. The Spanish banks have been uniquely exposed to these
winds of change because of their sudden exposure to European financial liberalization and
Latin American opportunities for growth.
 Although the Spanish banks’ expansion is a breakthrough in retail banking, it does not
pose a serious problem to existing theories of FDI. Asset-seeking, asset-exploiting and
oligopolistic behaviors account for the Spanish banks’ Latin American expansion. Scholars
initially formulated the bulk of FDI theory with manufacturing activities in mind; still
extensions to service industries such as banking are indeed appropriate and useful.
However, more research is needed better to understand and measure the intangible assets





In our interviews we promised confidentiality to our respondents. Therefore, we note
below the institutional affiliation of our interviewees as well as the place and date of
interview but do not reveal names or titles. We have listed the interviews chronologically.
Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, with an average of about 45 minutes.  The
33 interviewees included presidents, CEOs, vice-presidents or director-generals of 21
different banks, bankers’ associations and regulatory agencies in Argentina, Chile, México
and Spain. Therefore, in some cases more than one interviewee was present at the
interview.
List of Interviews
No. Venue Date Institution
  1. Santiago May 4, 1998 Superintendency for Banking and Financial
Institutions
  2. Banco Central de Chile
  3. May 5, 1998 Banco Santander Chile
  4. Citibank, Chile
  5. May 6, 1998 Research Department, Superintendency for Banking
and Financial Institutions
  6. Banco de Chile
  7. Santander Investment
  8. Buenos Aires May 7, 1998 Santander Investment
  9. Banco Río de la Plata
10. BBV Banco Francés
11. Superintendency of Financial Institutions, Banco
Central de la República Argentina
12. May 8, 1998 Financial Institutions Clearing House, Banco Central
de la República Argentina
13. Citibank Argentina
14. Asociación de Bancos de la República Argentina
15. Mexico City May 13, 1998 Financial Sector Bureau
16. National Banking and Securities Commission
17. May 14, 1998 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
18. Grupo Santander Mexicano
19. Madrid June 17, 1998 Banco Central Hispano
20. Inspection Bureau for Credit and Savings
Institutions, Banco de España
21. June 22, 1998 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya




Appendix B: The Portuguese Banks in Brazil and Latin America
 Portuguese banks too have recently started to acquire retail-oriented commercial
banks in Brazil, but little elsewhere in Latin America. While significant, the Latin
American operations of Portuguese banks, however, do not nearly compare to those of the
Spaniards, especially with respect to geographic scope.
 Like Spain, Portugal has undergone substantial deregulation. The nationalizations of
1975, led to a banking system that was 95% government-owned, though the three foreign-
owned banks (including Banco do Brasil which had entered in 1975) were unaffected. A
gradual process of deregulation began in 1984 with reprivatization starting in 1989
(Barros 1995). In 1991 the Espirito Santo family reclaimed Banco Espirito Santo e
Commercial. Since 1994, a wave of mergers has swept Portugal and the banking market is
now one of the freest in Europe.
 Banco Financial Portugues (BFP) has been in Brazil since 1887, however in a very
limited capacity. For much of its history it apparently existed to support the financial
affairs of the Portuguese consulates there. Other Portuguese banks that entered between
1900 and World War I included Banco Alliança (1906; head office Opporto), and Banco
Nacional Ultramarino (1912; head office Lisbon). Levy (1991) points out that the foreign
banks in Brazil were, “above all, tuned to international trade.”
 Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), the largest bank in Portugal and still government-
owned, has been in Brazil since 1924. In 1972 it bought BFP. It also bought 8% of Banco
Itau, Brazil’s second largest private bank. In 1997, CGD bought 79% of Banco
Bandeirantes; the acquisition will add 575 branches to the 3 that it owns through BFP.
CGD also has a representative office in Mexico and another in Venezuela. 
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 Banco Espirito Santo (BES) entered Brazil in 1975, just before the bank’s
nationalization. In 1976 it established Banco InterAltantico, a merchant bank consortium
that it co-owned with Credit Agricole of France, and the Brazilian industrial group,
Monteiro Aranha. In 1998, InterAtlantico acquired Banco Boavista, the 14
th largest
Brazilian bank, from the Paula Machado family; the owners have merged the two banks
into Banco Boavista InterAtlantico which is now the 9
th largest bank. BES also has a
representative office in Venezuela. BES is a member of the Inter-Alpha banking club, as is
Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya from whom it bought 17 branches in Spain.
 In 1991, Banco Comercial Portugues established a cross-shareholding agreement with
Banco Central Hispano of Spain. BCP now owns 6% of BCH and BCH owns 14% of
BCP. In 1992, the two each took 8% of Banco Bital in Mexico. Reportedly, BCP wishes
to withdraw from Bital. Doing so would leave BCP with no operations in Latin America.
 In 1993, Banco Portugues do Atlantico (BPA) established a subsidiary in Brazil.
Banco Commercial Portugues (BCP) took control of BPA in 1995 and in 1998 sold the
Brazilian operation to Wachovia Bank of the US, which changed the name to Banco
Wachovia. In 1998 Banco Portugues de Investimento (BPI) announced that it would open
a representative office in Brazil and expand into securities. Banco Itau owns 10% of BPI,
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Table 1: Acquisitions of Banks
1 in Latin America since 1990 by Spanish Banks
Acquisition
Year





1990 Santander Caguas Central Federal Savings Bank Puerto Rico 100 51
1991 BBV Probursa Mexico 70 480
1992 BCH GFBital Mexico 8 105
1995 OHCH
4 Banco Santiago Chile 79
6 1050
6
OHCH Banco del Sur Peru 49 108
Santander Banco Interandino & Intervalores Peru 100 45
Santander Banco Mercantil Peru 100 44
1996 BBV Banco Francés del Río de la Plata Argentina 52 300
BBV Banco Ganadero Colombia 59 328
BBV Banco Oriente & Banco Cremi Mexico 100 21
BBV Banco Continental Peru 60 256
BBV Banco Provincial Venezuela 40 300
OHCH Banco Tornquist Argentina 100 75
Santander Banco Osorno y La Unión Chile 51 496
Santander Banco Central Hispano Puerto Rico Puerto Rico 99 289
Santander Banco de Venezuela Venezuela 93 351
1997 BBV Banco de Crédito Argentino Argentina 100 466
Santander Banco Río de la Plata Argentina 64 1068
Santander Banco Noroeste Brazil 80 500
Santander Banco Geral do Comercio Brazil 50 202
Santander Banco Comercial Antioqueño Colombia 55 146
Santander Grupo Financiero InverMéxico Mexico 61 502
1998 BBV Banco Industrial Bolivia
5
BBV Banco Excel Economico Brazil 55 450
BBV Banco Hipotecario de Fomento Chile 55 352
BBV Banco Ponce Puerto Rico 100 166
BBV Opns. of Chase Manhattan Puerto Rico 50-60
BBV Banco Pan de Azúcar Uruguay
5
BCH Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires Argentina 10 c.200
OHCH Banco Santa Cruz Bolivia 100 160
OHCH Banco Asunción Paraguay
5
1999 Santander Banco de Río Tercero Argentina 6
BBV CorpBanca Argentina 100 84
Sources: Annual reports and news reports.
Notes: 1) We have not listed the numerous acquisitions of credit card, consumer and commercial loan, insurance, stock
brokerage and pension fund management companies. 2) Year of initial purchase even if subsequent purchases followed.
3) Cumulative to present. 4) OHCH was a holding company jointly owned by Banco Central Hispano (BCH) and the
Luksic family through its holding in Banco O’Higgins. 5) Announced but not yet completed. 6) In 1999, BSCH paid








Assets (bn$) 171 139 77
Net loans (bn$) 72 57 39
Net interest income/ATA 2.3 3.0 2.7
Operating expenses/ATA 2.6 2.8 2.5
ROA (%) 0.7 1.0 0.6
ROE (%) 19 18 11
Branches (Spain) 3,842 2,829 2,659
Branches (Abroad) 1,446 1,520 212








Table 3: Acquisitions of Banks in Latin America since 1990 by Foreign (non-Spanish) Banks
Acquisition
Year






1992 Bank of Nova Scotia GFInverlat Mexico   15 106





Banco de Lima Peru   68   n.a.
Deutsche-
Sudamerika-
  nische Bank
Banco Credit Lyonnais
  Chile
Chile   88 49
1996 Banco Espirito Santo
  & Credit Agricole
3
Banco Boavista Brazil      c.
40
120
Bank of Montréal GFBancomer Mexico   16 475
Bank of Nova Scotia Banco Quilmes Argentina   95 245
Bank of Nova Scotia Banco Sudamericano Peru   25 14
Citibank Confia Mexico 100 45
Credit Agricole Banco Bisel Argentina  64-68
4
131
HSBC Banco Roberts Argentina   70 668
HSBC Bamerindus Brazil 100 940
HSBC Banco Santiago Chile    7 144
HSBC Banco Serfin Mexico   20 300
HSBC Banco Sur Peru   10 16
1997 Chase Manhattan Banco Consolidado Venezuela   90
1998 ABN Amro Banco Real
6
Brazil Maj. 2100
ABN Amro Banco do Estado de
Pernambuco
Brazil 100 154
Caixa Geral de Banco Bandeirantes Brazil   79 64-300
5
Citibank Banco Mayo Cooperativo Argentina 100 n.a.
Wachovia Bank Banco Portugues do
Atlantico-Brasil
Brazil
Bank of Nova Scotia Banco del Caribe Venezuela   25 88
Standard Chartered Extebandes 165
Sources: News reports.
Notes: 1) Year of initial purchase if subsequent purchases followed. 2) Cumulative to present. 3) The two
banks jointly own Banco InterAtlantico-see Appendix B-into which they have merged Boavista. The
shareholding percentage refers to Banco Espirito Santo, whereas the US$ amount is the total price the
banks paid Boavista. 4) Reports differ; also, Credit Agricole owns 20% of Chile’s Banco del Desarrollo,
































Argentina 19 98 36 22 8.5 9.2 11
Brazil 26 97 48 9 6.0 6.8 6
Chile 36 62 14 21 3.0 6.1 1
Colombia 20 86 23 4 7.3 8.3 3
Mexico 25 87 28 1 3.9 5.1 15
Venezuela 17 92 30 1 5.7 8.1 18
India 45 80 87 7 2.6 2.9 20
9
Hong Kong 166 … 0 78
4
1.5 2.2 3
Singapore 81 71 0 80 1.4 1.6 …
Indonesia 47 91 48 4 2.4 3.3 11
South Korea 43 38 13 5 1.7 2.1 1
Malaysia 85 64 8 16 1.6 3.0 8
Taiwan n.a. 80 57 5 1.3 2.0 3
Thailand 75 75 7 7 1.9 3.7 8
Germany 64 77 50
4
4 1.1 1.4 …
Japan 111 79 0 2 0.8 1.1 3
Spain 78 … … 2 … … 4
United States 60 23 0 22 3.7 3.7 2
Notes: 1) Money and quasi money as a percentage of GDP in 1996; Malaysia in 1995. 2) Assets as a percentage of the
assets of banks and non-bank financial institutions in 1994. 3) Percentage share of assets in 1994. 4) Not strictly
comparable. 5) Percentage share of assets; date not given. 6) As a percent of total assets, averaged over 1990-94. 7) As a
percent of total assets, averaged over 1990-94. 8) Average 1994-95; these figures may not be strictly comparable. 9)
Relates only to public sector banks.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998. Goldstein, M. and P. Turner. 1996. “Banking Crises in
Emerging Economies: Origins and Policy Options.” BIS Economic Papers No. 46.
 
 